State v Thaddius Anderson :: 141 Wn2d 357
Category: Strict Liability
The issue before this court is “whether ‘knowing possession’ is an element of the crime of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.” [at 359]. This is not to be confused with the defendant’s knowing the possession was illegal. Furthermore, reading through the appellate court account, there was testimony the officers saw the defendant reach under the seat, where the gun was later discovered. Our intent in this review is not to decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Our interest is in the question before the court: The question is whether the defendant is guilty of possession if he did not know the gun was in the car he was driving.
Strict liability issues are difficult. Strict liability can basically be defined as guilt by fact. It does not consider knowledge and/or intent. Therefore, if an ex-con is in the proximity of a firearm, such as in a car, or a room, he is automatically guilty, whether or not he knows of the weapon, and regardless of any intent to use it. The purpose of strict liability laws is to ease the burden upon the court and increase public safety. However, as such, they deprive the innocent (by knowledge and/or intent) of due process.
The trial court “instructed the jury that knowledge of the existence of the handgun was not an element of the offense.” [at 360]. The Supreme Court, however, held that knowledge is an element of the offense. [at 359]. The high court also found that the Legislature did not eliminate lack of knowledge as a defense in the statute [at 363] and that the Legislature “did not indicate the problem [of increasing violence] should be addressed by sweeping entirely innocent conduct within this statute...” [at 362].
The dissenters’ basic argument against the finding of the court is that the intent of the Legislature is vague. Upon that, they conclude the weight should favor the court, not the defendant. They ignore, however, that our Bill of Rights supports due process (Amendments Five and Twenty-Three) and the concept of “innocent until proven guilty.”
This is our first time reviewing an opinion written by Justice Faith Ireland. Although we strongly disagree with the conclusions of her dissent, she wrote a concise and very interesting argument. Here is an excerpt from Justice Ireland’s dissent:
Criminal offenses can be broken down into two general categories ¾ malum in se and malum prohibitum. The distinction between [these two] offenses is best characterized as follows: a malum in se offense is “naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community,” whereas a malum prohibitum offense is wrong only because a statute makes it so. “Public welfare offenses” [as they ascribed this case] are a subset of malum prohibitum offenses as they are typically regulatory in nature and often result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. [at 369, cites omitted and most italics added].
As the majority opinion pointed out at 365, “the fact that the offense carries with it a maximum term of five years’ imprisonment is clearly a factor that weighs in favor of a holding that this offense is not one of strict liability. . . . we fail to see how their unwitting possession of a firearm poses a significant danger to the public. Neither does the punishment of such persons further a goal of deterrence.” [cites omitted]. In other words, this malum prohibitum, as the dissenting opinion construes it, does “result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property [of the defendant] but [and does not] merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.” [rewording of dissenting quote above].
When God established the laws of the nation of Israel, He held intent to be a significant element of both crime and punishment. This is recorded in Exodus 21, Numbers 35 and Joshua 20. If, understanding this, our Founding Fathers established the theory of due process within the foundation of our laws, should we now turn that aside, only because we see society becoming more violent? How can the socialist utopians demonstrate that more regulation will lessen the violent nature of man? After all, more crimes created by statute will inevitably result in more criminals, will it not? Maybe it is time to consider this: it is not the absence of laws that is leading our society to be more corrupt ¾ it is the fact that we have left the foundation our Founding Fathers built upon, the Biblical foundation of societal values and law.
Rating the Usual Suspects:
| pass | Alexander, Gerry | |
| pass | Guy, Richard | |
| pass | Johnson, Charles | |
| pass | Madsen, Barbara | |
| pass | McCrae, Kira | |
| pass | Mittlestat, Michael | |
| pass | Sanders, Richard | |
| fail | Agid, Susan | |
| fail | Becker, Mary Kay | |
| fail | Bridge, Bobbe | |
| fail | Ireland, Faith | |
| fail | Kennedy, Faye | |
| fail | Maleng, Norman | |
| fail | Smith, Charles | |
| fail | Street, Jim | |
| fail | Summers, Ann Marie | |
| fail | Talmadge, Phil |