State v Kenneth O Jackson :: 124 Wn2d 359
Category: Due Process
The Washington State Supreme Court has ruled that a criminal on the lam may not be tried in absence. If tried, the verdict will have null effect and must be retried upon capture. This is an important constitutional issue, as none of us would cotton to our prosecutors charging us, then trying us in court in our absence. The Superior Court Criminal Rules provide for the presence of the defendant at every stage of the trial (CrR 3.4(a)).
The case was in regards to a Mr. Jackson, who was prosecuted for statuary rape. He attended the omnibus hearings, waived his right of appearance (to the hearings) and subsequently fled before deposition and trial could commence.
The trial court issued a bench warrant for his arrest, pursuant to CrR 3.4(c), then commenced the trial (one day after the scheduled trial and almost a month after the bench warrant was issued). It was not stated that this was in conformance to CrR 3.4(b), but the Superior Court did contend that Jackson was voluntarily absent. CrR 3.4(b) provides that a trial, once begun, will continue through and including the return of verdict in the event of a defendant’s voluntary absence.
The case that was used to reverse the lower court ruling is State v Hammond [121 Wn2d 787 (1993)]. Hammond's situation is different. He had notified the court of his whereabouts, but claimed to lack the means to make the trip from California. He had requested the court to issue an arrest warrant so that he could be lawfully escorted. The court refused and tried him anyway.
The Hammond decision was reversed correctly, and it was for this and similar situations that the rule was written. This is a just interpretation of our constitutionally protected rights.
However, Jackson had previous convictions for assault, resisting arrest, and numerous traffic violations. So he was not unfamiliar with the workings of the court. “Fifteen years ago, Kenneth Jackson chose to flee Washington state rather than face trial for the first degree statutory rape on Christmas eve of his 4-year-old niece, who subsequently contracted gonorrhea.” [at 362, Judge Durham, dissenting].
The delay of trial for fifteen years, to protect the rights of a criminal who had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings, would have precluded the rights of the victim and the victim's family. The majority of the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded for a new trial. This will basically set Jackson free, as it will be difficult to reconstruct the evidence and testimonies fifteen years after the fact. This case is in no way related to ex-post facto, attainder, etc. This is a travesty of justice. The Court is more concerned about the rights of Mr. Jackson than they are about the niece whose rights and virtue he violated. To affirm the Superior Court on this case would have not jeopardized our rights under our State and national constitutions.
Rating the Usual Suspects:
| pass | Clem, Dan | |
| pass | Durham, Barbara | |
| pass | Hanley, Terence | |
| fail | Dolliver, James | |
| fail | Guy, Richard | |
| fail | Johnson, Charles | |
| fail | Madsen, Barbara | |
| fail | Reese III, James | |
| fail | Smith, Charles | |
| fail | Utter, Robert |