Snohomish County v Anderson :: 124 Wn2d 834
Category: Initiative and Elections
The elected officials of Snohomish County sued the individual citizens who filed a county referendum. On 07 Oct 93, [123 Wn2d 151] the Court had accelerated the review of the trial court’s declaratory relief. One year later, this hearing was held to review the trial court’s disposition of several remaining issues. The court considered the claims of the defendants that the trial court erred by:
1. refusing to reach the merits of the citizens’ affirmative defense that RCW 36.70A.210 is an unconstitutional delegation of power to the county;
2. dismissing their counterclaim that the 1991 amendment to the GMA is unconstitutional;
3. dismissing their counterclaim that Snohomish County ordinance 93-004 is unconstitutional;
4. ruling against their counterclaim that writs of mandamus should have been issued;
5. ruling against their counterclaim that the County had improperly expended public funds;
6. ruling against their counterclaim that the County had violated their civil rights;
7. granting the County’s motion for a summary judgment that ordinance 93-004 is not subject to a referendum.
The Supreme Court concluded that, “none of these actions constitutes reversible error.”
1. Judge Utter understands the claim of affirmative defense and quotes the definition from Black’s Law dictionary. Then he decides that their affirmative defense that the RCW 36.70A.210 is unconstitutional, if proved true, would not subject the ordinance to a referendum. What he fails to acknowledge is that if the RCW is unconstitutional, the ordinance is null as well. He has failed to uphold art. 1, sec. 1 of our State Constitution, which states that “All political power is inherent in the people. . .” and art. 1, sec. 4, “The right of petition . . . shall never be abridged.” In fact he has taken these powers away from the people. The judge gets around the substance of the argument by ruling on the procedure.
2. He decided that they lacked standing to argue the constitutionality of the GMA or its amendment because they had no dispute. He contended that the cities are in a better position to argue this claim because it is their land-use powers that are at stake. The citizens have no land use powers. He failed to acknowledge that the reason the people vest their authority in the government and conversely retain the right of petition is to give land-use, police and other powers to a jurisdiction created by the people for the enforcement of law and protection of property. Therefore, the people do have a vested interest in land-use powers and they have every authority to hold their governments accountable. Our State and federal Constitutions are specific and forceful regarding our rights to self-government and holding our civil government accountable to these constitutions.
3. Regarding the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, the Judge declared that the trial courts’ denial of the citizens’ counterclaim was harmless because the ordinance does not affect the citizens’ legal rights. Somehow this judge can understand the usurping of a government body’s right to legislate, but cannot comprehend that the effect of the legislation may violate the rights of the people. He implies that because the people do not legislate, their ability to legislate is not harmed. Furthermore he quotes the section of RCW 36.70A.210 that says that, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the land-use powers of cities.” That disclaimer is not sufficient to ignore the fact that the rest of the RCW does, in fact, alter the land use powers of the cities. This was the contention of the city of Lynnwood in City of Edmonds and City of Lynnwood v Snohomish County, Central Puget Sound Growth Planning Hearings Board, Case No. 93?3?0005.
4. [In addressing these seven remaining issues, the judge set forth the mandamus issue as #4 and the civil rights issue as #6. but in setting forth his decision, he switched these two points]. The judge decided that the citizens’ federal civil rights were not violated. He claimed that this was because the citizens had “not shown how a right to petition for referendum, guaranteed by the county charter supports a violation of 42 USC § 1983.” [at 844]. Furthermore, they had not cited “any federal provision guaranteeing their alleged right to petition government through a referendum at the local level.” [at 844]. Has he forgotten our federal and State constitutions? This judge does not interpret constitutional [State: art. 1, sec. 1 & 4; Snohomish County: art. 5] and Bill of Rights [amendment 1& 9] rights to be protected under any civil rights statute. He does not say so, but he implicitly affirms that statute holds more weight than constitution.
5. The court finds the ordinance to be valid which nulls the citizens’ claim against the expenditure of public money.
6. The court finds the ordinance to be valid which nulls the citizens’ claim for writ of mandamus.
7. “We already decided this issue in Anderson when we affirmed the declaratory judgment of the trial court that ordinance 93-004 was not subject to a referendum.” [at 845]. The Court was not interested in reconsidering their decision from the previous hearing one year earlier. The substance of these issues was not considered. Every issue was decided by procedural aspects.
Long live our Constitution.
Rating the Usual Suspects:
| pass | Rowley, Robert C | |
| pass | Smith, Douglas | |
| fail | Alumbaugh, Jo Anne | |
| fail | Dolliver, James | |
| fail | Durham, Barbara | |
| fail | Gregoire, Christine | |
| fail | Guy, Richard | |
| fail | Howard, William | |
| fail | Johnson, Charles | |
| fail | Madsen, Barbara | |
| fail | Prud'homme, Tommy | |
| fail | Robertson, Thomas | |
| fail | Smith, Charles | |
| fail | Utter, Robert |