King County v Taxpayers of King County, et al :: 133 Wn2d 584
Category: Land Use and Property Rights
This is the third hearing before the Supreme Court in regards to the Mariner’s Baseball Stadium. This case underscores the problems inherent with an unpracticed judiciary. Not only are the majority of our Supreme Court Justices inexperienced on the bench or before the bar, most of them have no recall and certainly no respect for the plain wording of the Constitution.
The fact of the matter remains that article eight, section seven of the Washington State Constitution clearly states that no money from any public coffer is to be given over to, or to aid, any private corporation. This includes buildings and this includes the sports profession. Justice Dolliver wrote in the Puget Sound Law Review in 1989 how this article of the Constitution was established to circumvent these types of situations. [at 620, cites omitted]. He argued that by the time of our constitutional convention in 1889, local governments had subsidized private corporations, especially railroads, to entice them to stay and do business in our territories. This always worked for the detriment of the local governments and the benefit of the corporations receiving special subsidies. Thus, this article was intended for the protection of the public purse. Alas, Justice Dolliver, unlearned from his own research, sided with the majority to favor the stadium over the taxpayer.
Although the majority report was written by one of the more experienced of the jurists, Justice Talmadge, he does serious injury to legal doctrine and definitions. First, he writes, “Laches [too much time and delay on the part of the defendant taxpayers] now prevents subjecting Ordinance 12000 [the King County Ordinance authorizing the creation of the Public Facilities District for the baseball stadium] to a referendum.” [at 612 n.14]. As Justice Sanders, the most experienced jurist on the bench, points out in his dissent, “Laches is an affirmative defense to a suit in equity; the doctrine has no application to the effectiveness of a statute or ordinance.” [at 642, cite omitted]. “Even where laches is appropriately invoked, it is only available as a shield, but never a sword.” [at 642, cite omitted].
The second abuse of legal doctrines and definitions occurs with their use of the phrase, “their day in court.” [at 613 n.14]. This was in relation to two taxpayers who filed motions, pro se, against the County. Justice Sanders corrects their vernacular terminology with proper legal doctrine. “Noteworthy is the majority’s failure to invoke the terms res judicata [already settled by judgment] or collateral estoppel [cannot retry matters determined by judgment] which, indeed are the only legal doctrines arguably available to sustain the majority’s result. I am not familiar with the ‘day in court’ rule of issue preclusion nor does the majority aid my legal education with even the most rudimentary citation to authority.” [at 645, italics added].
As Justice Sanders also pointed out, this decision of the majority fails by analyzing the donative intent, which the majority denies. The $45 million the Mariners agreed to pay toward the construction costs will not only be recovered by selling the naming rights, but will be subtracted from their other obligations as a loss. [By the way, this is equal to only one-and-one-half year’s equitable lease on a building of this magnitude]. There will be no profit sharing. The $700,000 annual rent is one-fiftieth the normal rent of a $415 million dollar stadium. The Public Facilities District must pay rent to the Mariners for their office space in a building they ‘own’ and manage. The Mariners will dictate how the Public Facilities District will spend the annual rent money collected, which will not return to the taxpayer. The Mariners will pocket all the parking revenue, which is almost equal to their rent obligation. We could go on and on. The fact of the matter, is this building is clearly donated to the Mariners. The obligation to pay for it rests solely on the backs of the taxpayers of the State. Yes, State. The additional tax from King County is offset by a credit from the State, so the shortfall is made up by the remaining counties of the State. Moreover, in twenty years, the building will have no remaining value and we will start the cycle again.
Justice Madsen sided with Justice Sanders in support of the taxpayers and the Constitution
The Bible warns against politicians who will rob the labors of the people to build more and more lavish buildings (Jer. 22:13-17). Certainly there is always a “need” or crisis that can justify the extortion. In the end, the people are deceived, taxes go up and they leave the taxpayer hungry (Isa. 32:5-8). Isaiah condemns politicians who dream of great plans, but siphon off the best for themselves (or votes), convinced that tomorrow will be like today, or far better (Isa. 56:10-12).
Just as an aside, there is another lesson learned in the study of this case. By counting the ordinances adopted by the King County Council and the days between each (there were three affecting this court case), one can determine the Council is adopting between 1.08 and 1.35 ordinances (new laws) every day. This is an average using a seven-day week and no days off. God save the citizens of that county.
Rating the Usual Suspects:
| pass | Blankinship, John | |
| pass | Madsen, Barbara | |
| pass | Sanders, Richard | |
| pass | Sundberg, Kris | |
| fail | Alexander, Gerry | |
| fail | Carter, Larry | |
| fail | Collins, William B | |
| fail | Dolliver, James | |
| fail | Durham, Barbara | |
| fail | Even, Jeffrey T | |
| fail | Gregoire, Christine | |
| fail | Guy, Richard | |
| fail | Johnson, Charles | |
| fail | Lawrence, Paul J | |
| fail | Maleng, Norman | |
| fail | Moore, Kendall | |
| fail | Slonecker, Susan | |
| fail | Smith, Charles | |
| fail | Talmadge, Phil | |
| fail | Waldman, Bart | |
| fail | Yerxa, Quentin | |
| fail | Yu, Mary |