Brown v State :: 130 Wn2d 430
Category: Land Use and Property Rights
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. could not have written this majority opinion any better. After his fashion, the Court laid the foundation and then walked right around it to get to their intended result.
This case is before the Court to determine if the property owners adjacent to a railroad right-of-way have legal claim to the property once the railroad abandons it. In writing the majority opinion, Justice Johnson lays the foundation that “when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court’s duty to ascertain and enforce.” [at 437, lengthy record of cites omitted]. Then he cites a huge body of precedent to demonstrate that the Court has usually held that a railroad right-of-way, regardless how title is held, has always been recognized as merely an easement. [at 438-40]. Then he turns this all around by saying that: “Identifying the purpose of conveyance, however, does not resolve the issue at hand because a railroad can own rights of way in fee simple or as easements.” [at 440].
Arguing for the intent of the deeds, the property owners brought up the eminent domain language. Justice Johnson countered that the eminent domain language did not limit the deed, rather, it expanded the deed because of the use of the word “together.” [“Hereby granting and conveying . . . a fee simple title . . . together with all rights . . . by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.”] [at 440-41]. In plain language it is difficult to understand how the Court could even arrive at this conclusion.
Again, countering the eminent domain language, the Justice argues that the grantors welcomed the railroad and willing sold the land without threat of eminent domain. To this, Justice Sanders, in his dissent, makes a god point: “Would farmer Brown have sold his property to this railroad in fee simple absolute for $10.00 if (1) the property were to be used for a public trail . . .” [at 461. He also argues against the “willingness” of the property owners at 457].
In his dissent, Justice Sanders brings the Court back to the issue before them: that is, the intent. “The search for intent ends when the purpose is found.” [at 451]. He chides the Court for ignoring the intent, instead complicating the issue by splitting hairs on words and definitions.
Unless we are to disregard Judge Learned Hand’s admonition that we should not “make a fortress out of the dictionary,” I suggest we fulfill the intention of the parties to these early nineteenth century deeds, not fault farmers for not rewriting the preprinted deeds drafted by the railroad as we think Philadelphia lawyers might. [at 454].
Knowing full well that not only was the Constitution against them, but that there was law and a huge body of precedent on the side of the property owners, the Court twisted the arguments in the case in order to side with the granola set who want the right to bicycle through someone else’s back yard. Where in our Constitution or Bill of Rights is private property a public asset?
Rating the Usual Suspects:
| pass | Cadagan III, Dan | |
| pass | Friel, Wallis | |
| pass | Miller, Richard | |
| pass | Sanders, Richard | |
| fail | Alexander, Gerry | |
| fail | Bright III, John | |
| fail | Copley, David T | |
| fail | Dolliver, James | |
| fail | Durham, Barbara | |
| fail | Guy, Richard | |
| fail | Hahn, Susan | |
| fail | Johnson, Charles | |
| fail | Madsen, Barbara | |
| fail | Smith, Charles | |
| fail | Talmadge, Phil |